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RLUIPA: WHAT'S TIE USE?
Jason Z. Pesick*
After Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (RLUIPA), which protects religious land use, many observersfeared that the
legislation would allow religious organizations to flout land-use regulations. Because
RLUIPA defines "religious exercise" broadly, these observers feared the law would
protect an array of nonworship uses, including commercial ventures, as long as a
religious entity owned the land. More than a decade after RLUIPA's passage, this
Note concludes that courts have not interpreted religious exercise as broadly as those
observers feared. Courts have not, however, settled on a clear or consistent way of
interpreting religious exercise. This Note reviews the case law and extracts a
coherentframework to interpret religious exercise.
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INTRODUCTION
In Philip Roth's short story Eli the Fanatic, assimilated Jews in the
wealthy Protestant town ofWoodenton, New York threatened to enforce
zoning ordinances against a new yeshiva (an Orthodox Jewish school) that
moved into town.! Concerned that the conspicuous, religious Jews at the
yeshiva would threaten the "amity" between the Jews and non-Jews of
Woodenton, one of the leaders of the secular Jewish community said,
" [T]his is a matter of zoning, isn't it? Isn't that what we discovered? You
don't abide by the ordinance, you go. I mean I can't raise mountain goats,
say, in my backyard .... 2
Tensions between religious entities and their neighbors are not new.
Justice Cardozo identified some of the standard complaints: disruption of
neighbors' "peace and comfort" through "the parking of cars, the tooting
of horns, and the invasions of privacy attendant upon crowds."' But be-
cause one justification for zoning is to protect public morals, it may be
reasonable to give religious organizations-which enhance public mor-
",4
als-immunity from "the full impact of zoning restrictions .... On the
other hand, while religious activity may contribute to public morals, it
can also have the same negative impacts as other land uses.
This tension often raises the question of what is the appropriate bal-
ance between religious freedom and a community's ability to regulate
land use. Congress attempted to answer this question by passing the Reli-
gious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA),
which protects religious land use and institutionalized persons' religious
observance. The substantial burden provision in RLUIPA's land-use sec-
tion bars governments from implementing a land-use regulation that
imposes a substantial burden on "religious exercise," unless the regulation
meets strict-scrutiny review. The definition of religious exercise plays a
large role in RLUIPA's impact because a use only receives RLUIPA's sub-
stantial burden protection if the use qualifies as religious exercise.' This
1. PHILIP ROTH, Eli, the Fanatic, in GOODBYE COLUMBUS 179, 189 (Bantam Books
1963).
2. Id. at 200.
3. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Sahlem, 172 N.E. 455, 456 (N.Y 1930).
4. Ginsberg v. Yeshiva of Far Rockaway, 358 N.YS.2d 477, 481 (N.Y. App. Div.
1974).
5. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.
§5 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2006) [herinafter RLUIPA]; see Terry M. Crist 1II, Note, Equally
Confused: Construing RLUIPA's Equal Terms Provision, 41 ARIz. ST. LJ. 1139, 1139 (2009)
("[RLUIPA] purports to settle Free Exercise law once and for all, at least in the inexplica-
bly related fields ofland use and prisoner rights.").
6. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000cc(a)(1).
7. Heather M.Welch, Comment, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act and Mega-Churches: Demonstrating the Limits of Religious Land Use Exemptions in Federal
Legislation, 39 U. BAIT. L. REv. 255, 275 (2010) ("The application of RLUIPA and its
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Note discusses the definition of religious exercise in the substantial bur-
den provision of RLUIPA's land-use section.
After more than a decade since the statute's passage," this Note re-
views the way courts have interpreted religious exercise. Though courts
have not followed a consistent framework in interpreting religious exer-
cise, this Note concludes that-despite the predictions of numerous legal
scholars-courts have defined the term narrowly. This Note aims to bring
coherence to the body of court decisions interpreting religious exercise
and gleans from the case law a framework to assist courts, attorneys, local
governments, and religious organizations in determining whether a given
use is likely to qualify as religious exercise.
After RLUIPA's passage, many critics feared the statute would pro-
vide religious entities with tremendous insulation from land-use
regulation.! These commentators wrote that the broad language RLUIPA
uses to define religious exercise could provide its substantial burden pro-
tection to an array of uses largely unrelated to religion, save for the fact
that a religious entity owns the land.10 For example, the provision could
have protected uses that are often associated with religious entities but not
central to religious worship, like hospitals, facilities for childcare or charity
work, and administrative space. This fear was not unfounded. A New York
Times story found that megachurches (churches with a weekly attendance
of 2,000) now operate activities that include large athletic facilities, cor-
porate storage facilities, housing developments, and shopping centers."
heightened standard of review is heavily dependent on the Act's definition of the term
'religious exercise' because if a religious institution cannot demonstrate that a particular
land use policy affects their exercise of religion, then the institution cannot establish a
claim under RLUIPA.").
8. Pub. L. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§5 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2006)).
9. See Daniel P Lennington, Thou Shalt Not Zone: The Overbroad Applications and
Troubling Implications of RLUIPA's Land Use Provisions, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 805 (2006); see
also Brain Alden, Note, ReconsiderinR RLUIPA: Do Religious Land Use Protections Really
Benefit Religious Land Users?, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1779, 1783-88 (2010) (chronicling schol-
arly commentary concerned that RLUIPA would provide religious organizations with vast
land-use protection).
10. See, e.g., Sara C. Galvan, Note, Beyond Worship:The Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act of 2000 and Religious Institutions' Auxiliary Uses, 24 YALE L. & POCY
REv. 207, 222 (2006); see also Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLUIPA and
Federalism: Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and Its Impact on Local Govern-
ment, 40 URB. LAw. 195, 223 (2008) ("Thus, a critical question not yet clearly answered is
whether RLUIPA's protection of the exercise of religion is limited to obviously religious
uses, or whether it extends to arguably secular activities carried out by religious institu-
tions."); Welch supra note 7, at 275 (noting the array of uses in which religious
organizations now engage).
11. Diana B. Henriques & Andrew W Lehren, Megachurches Add Local Economy to
Their Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007, available at http://www.nytines.com/2007/
11/23/business/23megachurch.htnl?%20pagewanted=1. According to the Hartford Insti-
tute for Religious Research, there are about 1,300 megachurches in the United States.
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Critics have identified a number of reasons why RLUIPA should
not protect nonworship land uses. First, it is not consistent policy for a
hospital or movie theater to receive protection from land-use regulations
if a religious organization owns the facility, but not if a secular organiza-
S12tion owns it. Some commentators also believe that drawing such a
distinction violates the establishment clause.13 Furthermore, many of these
nonworship uses cause the very concerns local land-use regulations exist
to address, especially traffic.14 Finally, a definition of religious exercise that
includes a number of nonworship uses does not appear to be consistent
with the intent of the drafters." This Note, however, does not argue for a
particular interpretation of religious exercise. Rather, it reviews how
broadly courts have interpreted religious exercise and seeks to coherently
restate the trends.
SCOTT THUMMA & WARREN BIRD, NOT WHO You THINK THEY ARE: A PROFILE OF THE PEO-
PLE WHO ATTEND AMERICA'S MEGACHURCHES (2009), available at http://hirr.hartsem.edu/
megachurch/megachurch-attender report.htm.
12. See Lennington, supra note 9, at 834.
13. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (StevensJ., concur-
ring) ("If the historic landmark on the hill in Boerne happened to be a museum or an art
gallery owned by an atheist, it would not be eligible for an exemption from the city ordi-
nances that forbid an enlargement of the structure.") (discussing RLUIPA predecessor
RFRA); Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitutional Limitations on Congress's Power Over Local
Land Use: Why the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act is Unconstitutional, 2
ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 366, 433 (2009); Galvan, supra note 10, at 232-34.
14. Karen L. Antos, Note, A Higher Authority: How the Federal Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act Affects State Control Over Religious Land Use Conflicts, 35 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 557, 566 (2008) (explaining that RLUIPA marks a shift away from
traditional land-use policy, which gives significant authority to local officials).
15. The legislative history reads: "This Act does not provide religious institutions
with immunity from land use regulation, nor does it relieve religious institutions from
applying for variances, special permits or exceptions, hardship approval, or other relief
provisions in land-use regulations, where available without discrimination or unfair delay."
146 CONG. REC. S7774, S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) Ex. 1 (Joint Statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy on the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000).
The legislative history continues:
The definition of"religious exercise" under this Act includes the "use, build-
ing, or conversion" of real property for religious exercise. However, not every
activity carried out by a religious entity or individual constitutes "religious
exercise." In many cases, real property is used by religious institutions for
purposes that are comparable to those carried out by other institutions.
While recognizing that these activities or facilities may be owned, sponsored
or operated by a religious institutions, or may permit a religious institution
to obtain additional funds to further its religious activities, this alone does
not automatically bring these activities or facilities within the bill's definition
or [sic] "religious exercise." For example, a burden on a commercial building,
which is connected to religious exercise primarily by the fact that proceeds
from the building's operation would be used to support religious exercise, is
not substantial burden on "religious exercise." Id.
[VOL. 17:359362
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Though the framework that this Note extracts will assist judges and
litigators, it is not an attempt to develop bright-line rules or factors, or a
test that courts must follow. Rather, this Note assists courts by identifying
trends in court opinions. It develops a framework that describes three
considerations courts have used when confronting the breadth of the
term religious exercise.
Part I provides background on the Supreme Court's free exercise
doctrine, which resulted in the enactment of RLUIPA, and then discusses
the relevant provisions of RLUIPA in greater detail. Part II describes the
discussion over how broadly the statute defines religious exercise and ex-
plains the current, often-conflicting interpretations of religious exercise.
Part III provides a helpful framework drawn from the common approach-
es courts have taken. Part III also briefly explains how the courts'
interpretation of "substantial burden" further limits protection of nonwor-
ship uses.
I. CHANGES IN FREE EXERCISE DOCTRINE LEAD TO RLUIPA
A. Free Exercise Background
The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
Historically, the Court's free exercise doctrine distinguished between free-
dom of belief and freedom of conduct." For example, though Chief
Justice Warren wrote that "freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions
is absolute,"'8 he rejected the challenge by Orthodox Jewish merchants to
a criminal law prohibiting the sale of various merchandise on Sundays.' 9
The law affected the merchants' businesses because as Orthodox Jews,
they were unable to work on Saturdays, and they wanted to remain open
on Sundays to make up for the loss of Saturday business. 20 The Court re-
jected their argument because the statute imposed only an indirect
burden on religion; it did not directly bar a religious practice.2
Sherbert v. Verner represents a high-water mark for the free exercise
clause. In that case, the Court held that South Carolina's denial of unem-
ployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to work on
16. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
17. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879) ("Laws are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.").
18. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961).
19. Id. at 609.
20. Id. at 601.
21. Id. at 606.
22. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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Saturdays violated her free exercise rights.23 Justice Brennan wrote that the
government forced the plaintiff to choose between her religion and re-
ceiving benefits-"the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of
religion as ... a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship."2 4
Justice Brennan applied strict-scrutiny review and invalidated the state
statute that disqualified the plaintiff from receiving benefits.25
But in Employment Division v. Smith,26 the Court limited the free ex-
ercise doctrine. The Court held that Oregon could criminally bar the use
of peyote for religious purposes and deny unemployment benefits to indi-
viduals terminated for using the drug.27 The Court noted that it had only
applied Sherbert's strict-scrutiny test in unemployment compensation cas-
es,28 and then said that the test was not appropriate in the case of generally
applicable laws.2 Not wanting judges to inquire into the centrality of a
religious practice to an individual's beliefs, the Court also rejected an ap-
proach in which courts would apply a strict-scrutiny test when
government prohibited conduct central to an individual's religion.30 The
Court affirmed this holding in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hia-
leah.
Congress responded to the Smith decision by passing the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), an attempt to return free ex-
ercise jurisprudence to the Sherbert rule.32 RFRA concisely but boldly
stated, "Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, ex-
33
cept" if the act passes strict-scrutiny review.
But the Court did not allow Congress to have the last say in the
matter and responded by striking down RFRA, at least as applied to state
34
and local governments. In City of Boerne v. Flores, members of a San An-
tonio-area Catholic church wanted to expand the church's building to
23. Id. at 401-02.
24. Id. at 404.
25. Id. at 406-07.
26. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
27. Id. at 890.
28. Id. at 883.
29. Id. at 885.
30. Id. at 886-87.
31. 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) ("[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability
need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the inci-
dental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.").
32. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141,
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (noting the purpose of the
act was to restore the Sherbert test), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
33. 42 U.S.C. %§ 2000bb-1(a)-(b)(2006).
34. See Cutter v.Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 n.2 (2005) (noting that the Court has
not ruled on whether RFRA still applies to the federal government).
364 [VOL. 17:359
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accommodate a growing group of regular worshippers." The city denied
the San Antonio Archbishop's application for a building permit, arguing
that the church was part of a historic district. The Archbishop responded
by filing suit in federal court. The question in the case was whether
Congress exceeded its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment3 8 by enacting RFRA. 9 The Court answered in the
affirmative, holding that the Amendment's enforcement power is "'reme-
dial."' o The Court said that the power to enforce the free exercise clause
does not include the power to alter free exercise doctrine.4 ' The Court
also found that there was not sufficient evidence to support Congress's
view that remedial measures to protect religious groups were necessary to
combat religious bigotry carried out though generally applicable laws.42
RFRA applied to federal, state, and local officials, as well as to all federal
and state law-the law's breadth indicated it was not an enforcement
measure, the Court reasoned. 43 The Court called the legislation "a consid-
erable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and
general authority to regulate the health and welfare of their citizens. 4 4
After the Court gutted RFRA, Congress made the next move.
B. The Mechanics of RLUIPA's Substantial Burden Provision
Eventually, Congress responded with the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000." RLUIPA is far more limited than
46RFRA. It protects only two forms of religious exercise: land use and
35. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. This section reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 5.
39. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517.
40. Id. at 519 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)).
41. Id. ("Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the
right is.").
42. Id. at 530 (distinguishing between laws that target religious groups and "laws of
general applicability which place incidental burdens on religion").
43. Id. at 532.
44. Id. at 534.
45. Senators Orin Hatch and Edward Kennedy led the effort to pass the bill in the
Senate. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000). RLUIPA's drafters intended the
legislation to apply the same standard as RFRA, but in a more limited set of cases. 146
CONG. REc. at S7774 Ex. 1 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (Joint Statement of Sen. Hatch and
Sen. Kennedy on the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000).
46. In addition to limiting RLUIPA's scope, Congress also gave RLUIPA more
secure footing than RFRA by giving it three jurisdictional bases. The land-use provisions
apply in any cases in which 1) the substantial burden is imposed by a program that receives
federal funding, even if the rule imposing the burden is of general applicability; 2) the
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religious exercise by institutionalized persons. RLUIPA prevents gov-
ernment from implementing "a land use regulation in a manner that
imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, includ-
ing a religious assembly or institution, unless" the burden furthers a
compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of "fur-
thering that compelling governmental interest." 8
In response to Boerne, in which the Court admonished Congress
that the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement provisions are remedial, 49
RLUIPA's legislative history includes evidence that the right to exercise
religion "is frequently violated.",o According to the legislative history, such
discrimination is frequent because of "the highly individualized and dis-
cretionary processes of land use regulation."" Some observers have
written that Congress did not thoroughly consider these allegations of
discrimination or take into account the other side of the story: the views
of homeowners and local governments.52 But proponents of the statute
argue it protects religious minorities." During one hearing, a House sub-
committee was told that religious groups that make up nine percent of
burden or removal of the burden would affect interstate commerce, even if the burden is
the result of a rule of general applicability; and 3) the burden is imposed through land-use
regulation in which the government engages in procedures that allow it to make "individ-
ualized assessments of the proposed uses of the property involved'" Id.; RLUIPA 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc(a)(2)(A)-(C). These jurisdictional hooks are based on the spending clause, the
commerce clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment. 146 CONG. REc. at S7775-76. See
Lennington, supra note 9, at 814 n.54 (arguing application of a general zoning law should
not count as an "individualized assessment").
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 at cc, cc-1. The institutionalized persons provision proscribes
government from imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by individuals
confined to an institution, even if the burden is the result of a generally applicable rule,
unless the burden is the least restrictive way to further a compelling interest. In other
words, the burden must meet strict-scrutiny review. This provision is beyond the scope of
this Note.
48. Id. at § 2000cc(a)(1)(A), (B). The land-use section of RLUIPA also contains
provisions prohibiting government from imposing land-use regulations that treat religious
assemblies or institutions on less than equal terms than nonreligious assemblies or institu-
tions, as well as a provision prohibiting government imposition of a land-use regulation
that discriminates against an assembly or institution on the basis of religion, and a provi-
sion prohibiting government from imposing a land-use regulation that "totally excludes
religious assemblies from a jurisdiction" or "unreasonably limits" religious institutions in a
jurisdiction. See Lennington, supra note 9, at 815 (noting these other land-use provisions
have been "infrequently applied and seldom used by plaintiffs").
49. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997).
50. 146 CONG. REC. Ex. 1 at S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (Joint Statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy on the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000) (referring to religious entities' land use).
51. Id.
52. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 10, at 206-07.
53. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RE-




the population are involved in half the reported litigation over the loca-
tion of churches.5 4
Courts have interpreted various provisions of RLUIPA inconsistent-
ly because the statute's language is unclear.5 In particular, a number
of questions remain about RLUIPA's substantial-burden land-use
provisions. These include questions about the meanings of such terms as
land-use regulation,5 7 religious exercise, substantial burden, compelling
governmental interest, and individualized assessment." This Note focuses
on only one of those questions: the definition of religious exercise. It ex-
amines the breadth of uses that receive protection under RLUIPA's
substantial burden provision.
RLUIPA's definition of religious exercise is novel and cannot be
traced to previous case law." The statute defines religious exercise broadly,
to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or cen-
tral to, a system of religious belief."O Therefore, as the Court did in Smith,
RLUIPA eliminates a centrality-of-belief test that would have courts in-
quire into how central an activity is to a system of religious belief before
deciding if the activity qualifies as religious exercise. In fact, provisions in
the statute support a broad understanding of religious exercise. RLUIPA
says, "The use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of
religious exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person
or entity that uses or intends to use the property for that purpose." 62 The
statute buttresses that definition with language instructing courts to pro-
vide maximal protection of religious exercise: "This chapter shall be
54. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 20 (1999).
55. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 10, at 219 ("If one argument in support of RLUIPA
is the need for uniformity and clarity in the protection of the free exercise of religion,
RLUIPA is failing miserably."); see also Cambodian Buddhist Soc'y v. Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 941 A.2d 868,890 (Conn. 2008).
56. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 10, at 219-46.
57. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Assessing RLUIPA's Application to Building Codes and Aes-
thetic Land Use Regulation, 2 ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 623, 630-35 (2009); see also Alden, supra
note 9, at 1795; Lennington, supra note 9, at 813 ("The key inquiry ... is whether the
action concerns zoning or something else.") (citing Prater v. City of Burnside, 280 F.3d
417, 434 (6th Cir. 2000), which held that the law must limit the manner in which an indi-
vidual can use or develop his property).
58. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 10, at 219-46.
59. Galvan, supra note 10, at 222; see Salkin & Lavine, supra note 10, at 222-25 (not-
ing free exercise jurisprudence has not considered land use to be religious exercise). For a
brief discussion of the difference between the definition of religious exercise within free
exercise jurisprudence as compared to RLUIPA, see Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v.
City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003); Cambodian Buddhist Soc'y v. Plan-
ning & Zoning Comm'n, 941 A.2d 868,888-89 (Conn. 2008).
60. 42 U.S.C. S 2000 at cc-5(7)(A)(2006).
61. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000 at cc-5(7)(A)(2006), with Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990).
62. 42 U.S.C. S 2000 at cc-5(7)(B)(2006).
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construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the max-
imum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the
Constitution."6 3
II. DEBATE SURROUNDING THE DEFINITION OF RELIGIOUs EXERCISE
The concern that RLUIPA's definition of religious exercise provides
protection to religious institutions' auxiliary (nonworship) uses arose be-
cause the statute does not distinguish between worship and nonworship
uses.64 "RLUIPA has significantly departed from prior law by expanding
the class of protected religious uses to all auxiliary uses," one commenta-
tor wrote, "including those that are not substantially related to a religious
institution's religious, educational or charitable mission." Citing policy
and constitutional concerns, the commentator concluded that Congress
should amend RLUIPA so that auxiliary uses which are not "substantially
related to a religious, educational or charitable mission" do not receive
protection under RLUIPA.6 6 Another commentator wrote that RLUIPA's
definition of religious exercise means that "if a church wants to build a
building, even it if is a school or a nursing home, then that building is
actually a religious exercise."6  Other commentators have noted that
RLUIPA compounded the impact of the proliferation of megachurches
and the numerous auxiliary, nonworship uses they include because it took
land-use regulatory authority away from local officials, with whom such
authority has traditionally rested.'
Other commentators have argued for a broader interpretation of re-
ligious exercise to protect religious entities' nonworship land uses, like
69
charitable work and education. In a report marking RLUIPA's tenth
anniversary, the Department of Justice compared the legislation to the
63. Id. at cc-3(g).
64. See, e.g., Galvan, supra note 10, at 209.
65. Id. at 220.
66. Id. at 210.
67. Lennington, supra note 9, at 814; see also Welch, supra note 7, at 275-76 ("Taken
to its logical extreme, the language of RLUIPA allows a religious institution to avoid hav-
ing to comply with local zoning regulations that would otherwise apply to its activities or
facilities that are unrelated to its beliefs or mission, or that would apply to a non-religious
institution offering the same amenities.").
68. Welch, supra note 7, at 282-87 (noting "RLUIPA does not address, nor does it
incorporate the critical differences in the land that it regulates."); Ariel Graff, Comment,
Calibrating the Balance of Free Exercise, Religious Establishment, and Land Use Regulation: Is
RLUIPA an Unconstitutional Response to an Overstated Problem, 53 UCLA L. REv. 485, 519
(2005) (arguing land use should be regulated at the local level).
69. See, e.g., Shelly Ross Saxer, Faith in Action: Religious Accessory Uses and Land Use
Regulation, 2008 UTAH L. REv. 593, 627-28 (2008); see also Roman P Storzer & Anthony
R. Picarello, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000:A Constitutional
Response to Unconstitutional Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929, 960 (2001).
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 and argued that the land use and institutional-
ized person provisions have "helped secure the ability of thousands of
individuals and institutions to practice their faiths freely and without dis-
crimination.,7 0 The report also noted approvingly the "wide range of
settings" in which courts have used the statute to protect religious exer-
* 71
cise.
Courts have not settled on a test or manner to determine whether a
given use falls under RLUIPA's definition of religious exercise. In Cutter, a
prisoners' rights case, the Supreme Court used a much narrower defini-
tion of religious exercise that it drew from Smith: "[T]he 'exercise of
religion' often involves not only belief and profession but the perfor-
mance of ... physical acts [such as] assembling with others for a worship
service [or] participating in sacramental use of bread and wine ....
Though this definition suggests that the Court defines religious exercise
narrowly, the Court has not yet addressed the definition of religious exer-
cise in the statute's land-use provisions. If the Court used the Cutter
definition in the land-use context, it would reduce RLUIPA's protection
of nonworship uses.
One California court broadly interpreted RLUIPA as "definitionally
equating land use with religious exercise."" In that case, the court found
that a city's denial of a permit to allow a church to relocate to another
part of downtown with more parking imposed a substantial burden on
religious exercise. Some courts assume that RLUIPA protects activities
that financially support or promote worship activities. For example, a
Maryland court held that a sign seeking to recruit freeway drivers to a
church qualified as religious exercise, though the court ruled against the
church in that case because it did not find a substantial burden on that
religious exercise.7 6 Similarly, a federal district court in Michigan decided
that concerts to raise money for and expand a church's membership were
70. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RELIGIOUS
LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT 2 (2010), available at http://
www.justice.gov/crt/rluipa-report_09221O.pdf.
71. Id. at 5.
72. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (citing Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 877 (1990)).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(B)'s inclusion of land use as a form of religious exercise
militates against Cutter's narrow definition in the land-use context.
74. Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 E Supp. 2d 1083, 1091
(C.D. Cal. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, No.
04-5532o, 2006 WL 2456271 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2006) (reversing district court's holding
that RLUIPA is unconstitutional).
75. Id.
76. Trinity Assembly of God v. People's Counsel, 941 A.2d 560, 574 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2008) ("Evangelism of this sort qualifies as a religious purpose."), af'd 962 A.2 404
(Md. 2008). See Saxer, supra note 57, at 637, for a discussion of whether aesthetics can be
considered religious exercise.
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religious exercise: "The fact that many . . . activities are not confined to
worship does not mean .. . that the acts themselves are not religious in
nature. In fact, many religions offer services beyond traditional worship
services as part of their religious offerings."77 In that case, however, the
facility also hosted worship services;8 it is not clear how the court would
have ruled if the facility in question did not host worship services.
Courts take for granted that building a religious temple qualifies as
religious exercise.79 Though religious schools would also seem to fall un-
der a broad definition of religious exercise, not all land uses by religious
schools receive RLUIPA's protection."' In Westchester Day School v. Village
of Mamaroneck, the Second Circuit reasoned in dicta that an expansion
project that included improvements to both secular and religious class-
rooms of a religious school did not necessarily receive protection under
RLUIPA.8 In that case, in which an Orthodox Jewish day school submit-
ted plans to expand both its religious and secular instruction space, Judge
Leval rejected an interpretation of RLUIPA that would protect
improvements to secular facilities at a religious school just because those
improvements would enhance the overall quality of the religious school's
education. He suggested that such a broad definition of religious exer-
cise violates the establishment clause because if a religious school and a
secular school both submitted applications to a zoning board to expand
their gymnasiums, the board would be able to deny the secular school's
application, but not the religious school's.
When the case returned to the Second Circuit after remand, a dif-
ferent panel reiterated that the denial of a proposal by a religious school
to build office space, a gymnasium, or a headmaster's residence would not
impose a substantial burden on religious exercise, and thus would not vio-
late RLUIPA."' The proper test, the court explained, was "whether the
proposed facilities were for a religious purpose rather than simply wheth-
er the school was religiously affiliated."" The court determined that the
77. Episcopal Student Found. v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F Supp. 2d 691, 701 (E.D.
Mich. 2004).
78. Id. at 693.
79. See, e.g., Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 E3d 978, 992 (9th Cir.
2006); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F3d 1214, 1225-26 (11th Cir.
2004).
80. San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir.
2004) ("Inasmuch as College intends to convert the Property from hospital use to a place
for religious education, it appears that a'religious exercise' is involved in this case.").
81. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F3d 338, 347-48 (2d Cit.
2007); 386 E3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2004).
82. Westchester, 386 F3d at 189-90.
83. Id. at 189.
84. Id.
85. Westchester, 504 E3d at 347-48.
86. Id. at 348.
370 [VOL. 17:359
RLUIPA:What's the Use?
expansion in question was religious exercise because the district court
found that each room would be used "at least in part for religious educa-
tion and practice."8 7 It declined to decide exactly when a school
expansion project is and is not religious exercise, but said the line "exists
somewhere between this case, where every classroom being constructed
will be used at some time for religious education, and a case ... where
religious education will not occur in the proposed expansion."
III.THE IMPACT OF A COHERENT FRAMEWORK
This Part will provide a method of analysis to determine whether a
given use should be considered religious exercise under the statute. It will
explain three limiting considerations distilled from the case law, and it will
introduce two threshold inquiries that predate RLUIPA. The first consid-
eration courts take into account is the type of activity in question, as
opposed to the type of organization engaging in the activity. Second, for
projects with more than one use, courts ask whether the primary purpose
of the project is a use considered religious exercise under the first consid-
eration. Third, activities that merely support religious exercise, like
improvements to the quality of the secular education program at a reli-
gious school, or fundraising, do not qualify as religious exercise.
In some cases all three considerations will be relevant, and courts
may consider them all. In other cases, not all of the considerations will be
relevant. They are not bright-line rules or factors that must be weighed in
every case. While the considerations identified in this Note represent an
attempt to clarify the law so that courts can apply it more uniformly,
bright-line rules proved too blunt a tool to define religious exercise under
RLUIPA. Religious practice and the facts of individual cases vary so dra-
matically that courts need leeway to examine the facts and avoid
unreasonable results.
These three considerations represent an attempt to bring coherence
to the body of case law and can help clarify the -law for litigators and
courts. Even if a court determines that a given use is religious exercise, the
land-use regulation still must impose a substantial burden on that religious
exercise to trigger RLUIPA's strict-scrutiny protection. This substantial
burden hurdle explains why the predictions many commentators made
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A. Threshold Inquiries
Before turning to the three-factor analysis to determine if an activi-
ty is religious exercise, courts should consider two threshold inquiries that
may make their job easier. First, though courts may not examine the cen-
trality of a practice to "a system of religious belief,"" they may examine
whether an activity is actually religious.9o Second, courts may also exam-
ine whether religious beliefs are sincere.9 1
The first threshold inquiry is not simply another way of restating the
question of what is religious exercise, but rather asks whether the plaintiff
is even engaging in religious conduct at all.The courts consider "whether
the belief exists and whether it is based on grounds other than religion."92
In Beechy v. Central Michigan District Health Department, Amish plaintiffs
claimed that because of their religious lifestyle they did not need a septic
93tank as large as the law required. The court found that a tank of the re-
quired size would not negatively impact the plaintiffs' religion and that
plaintiffs' concerns were based on practical concerns, like cost and con-
venience. Similarly, in Glenside Center, Inc. v. Abington Township Zoning
Hearing Board, the court held that Alcoholics Anonymous meetings were
not an exercise of religion because the purpose of the meetings was to
treat addictions, not advance religion." Based on these cases, it seems easi-
er for courts to find that an activity is not religious if the organization
engaging in the activity is not a religious organization.
The second threshold inquiry simply asks whether the plaintiff sin-
cerely views the given land use as a religious exercise. The court must
make a factual determination to answer this question. If the plaintiff
89. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000 at cc-5(7)(A)(2006).
90. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 10, at 221-22 (citing Beechy v. Cent. Mich. Dist.
Health Dep't, 475 F Supp. 2d 671, 683 (E.D. Mich. 2007); see also Glenside Cer., Inc. v.
Abington Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 973 A.2d 10, 17-18 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) (holding
that Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, which contain references to a higher power, did not
qualify as religious exercise).
91. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 10, at 222 (citing Cutter v.Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,
725 n.13 (2005) ("[T]he Act does not preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner's
professed religiosity."); see Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 E3d
643, 663-64 (10th Cir. 2006).
92. Beechy v. Cent. Mich. Dist. Health Dept., 475 F Supp. 2d 671, 683 (E.D. Mich.
2007), af'd 274 Fed. Appx. 481 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Moore King v. County of Chester-
field, No. 3:09 CV 804 JAG, 2011 WL 4589995, *14-15 (Ed.Va. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding
psychic did not engage in religious exercise).
93. Beechy, 475 F Supp. 2d at 684.
94. Id. Plaintiffs did not even claim that installation of the required tank "contra-
venes a tenet of their faith, or interferes with the practice of their religion." Id.
95. Glenside Ctr, Inc. v. Abington Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 973 A.2d 10, 17-18
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).
96. Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 E3d at 663-64.
97. Id.
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clears these two initial hurdles, a court should use the three factors ex-
plained below to evaluate whether the plaintiff's activity qualifies as
religious exercise under the statute.
B. Consideration One: Courts Focus on the Type ofActivity, Not the Type
of Organization Engaging in the Activity
The first and most important consideration courts take into account
when determining whether an activity is religious exercise is the nature of
the activity or use itself, in doing so, however, courts do not inquire into
the nature or identity of the entity engaging in the activity." As Judge
Leval noted, considering the identity of the organization engaging in the
activity could lead to an establishment clause violation by providing a giv-
en use more protection if a religious entity owns it.99 Because courts
examine the nature of the activity as opposed to the nature of the organi-
zation, RLUIPA does not protect secular activities merely because a
religious organization performs them.m
For example, the Michigan Supreme Court held that an apartment
complex proposed by a religious organization did not constitute religious
exercise under RLUIPA.'o The court held that the commercial activity of
constructing an apartment complex does not become religious exercise
merely because a religious organization constructs the apartments.102 Simi-
larly, other courts have held that daycare centers operated by religious
organizations do not quahify as religious exercise. o3
98. See, e.g., Greater Bible Way Temple of Jackson v. City of Jackson, 733 N.W2d
734, 746 (Mich. 2007); see also 146 CONG. REC. S7774, S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) Ex.
1 (Joint Statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy) ("[Not every activity carried out by
a religious entity or individual constitutes 'religious exercise: In many cases, real property is
used by religious institutions for purposes that are comparable to those carried out by
other institutions. While recognizing that these activities or facilities may be owned, spon-
sored or operated by a religious institution, or may permit a religious institution to obtain
additional funds to further its religious activities, this alone does not automatically bring
these activities or facilities within the bill's definition or 'religious exercise.' ").
99. See Westchester Day Sch. v.Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d 183, 189-90 (2d Cir.
2004).
100. See, e.g., Greater Bible Way, 733. N.W2d at 746 (explaining commercial activities
that religious organizations engage in do not fall under RLUIPA's definition of religious
exercise).
101. Id. at 745 (Mich. 2007) ("A 'religious exercise' consists of a specific type of exer-
cise, an exercise of religion, and this is not the equivalent of an exercise-any exercise-by a
religious body.").
102. Id. at 746. The court also pointed out that RLUIPA puts the burden on the
plaintiff of proving an activity is religious exercise. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000 cc-2(b)).
103. Ridley Park United Methodist Church v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 920 A.2d 953,
960 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007); see also Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne,
451 F3d 643, 663-64 (10th Cir. 2006) (upholding jury determination that daycare center
was not a sincere exercise of religion).
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Building worship facilities and religious schools, on the other hand,
does qualify as religious exercise. A federal district court held that removal
of religious artifacts to deconsecrate a church that is closing qualifies as
religious exercise as well.'" At least some charitable work that religious
organizations perform seems to fall within RLUIPA's definition of reli-
gious exercise. For example, a federal court in Florida found that a group
home serving as a ministry and rehabilitation center for men with sub-
stance-abuse problems qualified as religious exercise under RLUIPA.os
There is still confusion, however, as to exactly what types of charitable
activities courts consider religious exercise. Uses such as homeless shelters
and soup kitchens are often associated with religious entities, but it is not
clear if courts consider them religious exercise under RLUIPA.O
Courts do not seem to consider the use of administrative space to be
religious exercise. One court held that an expansion plan that included a
sanctuary area, but was primarily an expansion of administrative offices,
did not constitute religious exercise.107 Another court found that a parish
center that would contain an office for religious education, meeting space
for the parish council, and space for other church-related gatherings and
functions did fall under RLUIPA's definition of religious exercise.10 The
court found the parish center was intimately involved in the church's reli-
gious activity.I0
Courts also do not seem to consider recreational uses to be religious
exercise. A Pennsylvania appellate court held that a denial of a church's
application to use a campground and hiking trails as an accessory use to a
church and worship center did not violate RLUIPA.no A Rhode Island
104. Roman Catholic Bishop v. City of Springfield, 760 F Supp. 2d 172, 186 (D.
Mass. 2011).
105. Men of Destiny Ministries, Inc. v. Osceola Cnty., No. 6:06-cv-624-Orl-31DAB,
2006 WL 3219321, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2006).Though the court considered use of the
religious rehabilitation center to be religious exercise, the court ultimately found against
the ministry on its RLUIPA claims because, the court reasoned, relocating would not be a
substantial burden. Id. at *5. See infra Part IV. Substantial Burden Section for a discussion
of how the substantial burden requirement is further protection against land-use immunity
for religious organizations.
106. But see Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 E3d 570, 574
(2d Cir. 2002) (suggesting caring for homeless can be religious exercise under the free
exercise clause).
107. Cathedral Church of the Intercessor v. Vill. of Malverne, 353 E Supp. 2d 375,
390-91 (E.D.N.Y 2005) ("Simply because the Church is a religious institution does not
mean it receives an unencumbered right to zoning approval for non-religious uses."). Fac-
tors 1 and 2 are related, as this court also looked at the primary purpose of the expansion.
108. Mintz v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield, 424 F Supp. 2d 309, 319 (D.
Mass. 2006).
109. Id.
110. See City of Hope v. Sadsbury Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 890 A.2d 1137, 1149
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006). Accessory use is defined as "a use which is dependent on or per-
tains to the principle or main use." RATHKOPF 's THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 33:3
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court determined that a fitness center and dance studio open to the pub-
lic and in a high school building also did not count as religious exercise.
Judge Posner seems to have endorsed a broader definition of reli-
gious exercise.'12 "Souls aren't saved just in church buildings," he
declared."' He found a Christian organization's community center that
served the poor on Chicago's South Side and that mainly consisted of
"recreational and living facilities" to be "integral" to the organization's
religious mission."' While Judge Posner did not directly address the defi-
nition of religious exercise, what he perceived as the city of Chicago's
mistreatment of the small religious organization seems to have motivated
his decision that the city imposed a substantial burden in violation of
RLUIPA."s
The case highlights a complication in the way courts have interpret-
ed religious exercise: Different religious organizations define what
religious exercise means differently. For example, outreach, recreational, or
charitable activities may be a core part of one religious organization's
practices but not another's. And it seems odd for judges to establish rules
to define religious exercise. Judge Posner's approach of focusing on the
way a government treated a religious organization and determining
whether the government imposed a substantial burden on the religious
organization therefore seems appealing.
But RLUIPA's land-use provisions include other provisions that
prohibit government from treating a religious organization "on less than
equal terms with a nonreligious" organization and that prevent discrimi-
nation against a religious organization." 6 Furthermore, as discussed above,
the statute defines religious exercise, and the legislative history discusses
that definition, implying that the term has meaning that courts should
consider. If the imposition of a substantial burden on any activity a reli-
gious organization defined as religious exercise violated RLUIPA, a broad
range of activities could receive strict-scrutiny protection. This prospect
raises a number of policy and legal concerns and did not appear to be
the will of the statute's drafters. In practice, courts tend to engage in a
straightforward reading of the statute that asks whether a substantial
(4th ed. 2011). For a discussion of accessory uses and RLUIPA, see Saxer, supra note 69, at
636; see also Diane K. Hook, Comment, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000: Congress' NewivTwist on "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick," 34 Uns. LAW 829,
854 (2002) (discussing the expansion of the types of accessory uses RLUIPA could allow).
ill. See New Life Worship Ctr. v. Town of Smithfield Zoning Bd. of Review, C.A.
No. 09-0924, 2010 R.I. Super. LEXIS 101, at *4(H41 (R.I. Super. Ct.July 7, 2010).




115. Id. at 535-38.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (b)(2006).
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burden was present and whether government imposed the substantial
burden on an activity that qualifies as religious exercise. 1
While courts should further refine which types of uses they will
consider religious exercise, Consideration One assists them by advising
them to consider the nature of the use, not the identity of the organiza-
tion engaging in the use. This approach helps avoid violations of the
establishment clause, but it is not perfect because it puts courts in the
awkward position of defining the scope of religious exercise."" Despite
this difficulty, courts have followed this approach of focusing on the type
of activity in question, and it has led to a sensible interpretation of the
statute.'19
C. Consideration Two: Courts Inquire into the Primary Purpose
of Multiple- Use Projects
The second consideration courts take into account is the primary
purpose of a multiple-use project.' 20 Often the projects at issue are com-
plex, with both worship and nonworship components. When a project
contains many components, courts have considered whether the primary
purpose of the project is a use that courts consider religious exercise un-
der Consideration One.121 For example, if a religious organization
proposes to build a sanctuary with a gymnasium, the court would ask
117. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Bishop v. City of Springfield, 760 F Supp. 2d 172,
185-86 (D Mass. 2011) (asking first whether the case involves religious exercise and then
whether the government imposed a substantial burden on that religious exercise).
118. Adam J. MacLeod, Resurrecting the Bogeyman: The Curious Forms of the Substantial
Burden Test in RLUIPA, 40 REAL EsT. L.J. 115, 152-53 (2011) (raising concerns with the
test because "the process of separating the truly religious from the nominally religious
entails adjudicating the importance of various aspects of religious mission, and deciding
which activities are central or fundamental to a religious land user's mission and beliefs").
But, stating that the statute "simply cannot be meant to include within its protection every
activity claimed to be religious, or alleged to serve a religious mission or purpose," id. at
161, the article argues that RLUIPA's substantial burden provision should focus on pro-
tecting religious land uses with no secular analogues. Id. at 169-70.
119. Interestingly, Galvan, supra note 10, at 235, advocated amending RLUIPA to
define religious exercise as activities that are "substantially related to the religious, educa-
tional, or charitable mission of a religious institution." Her proposed definition may be
broader than what the courts have defined as religious exercise. For example, a headmas-
ter's residence, classrooms solely dedicated for secular education in a religious school, and
administrative offices may substantially relate to the educational mission of an institution.
Furthermore her inclusion of charitable activities could provide space for health-care facil-
ities, homeless shelters, soup kitchens, even warehouses that store food for needy families.
These uses are all good things, but the courts have not yet definitively classified them as
religious exercise under RLUIPA.
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whether the primary purpose of the project is the sanctuary or the gym-
nasium because only the sanctuary qualifies as religious exercise under
Consideration One.122 Courts might find this consideration attractive be-
cause it avoids the problem of religious organizations' bootstrapping a
religious component onto a secular project to gain RLUIPA's protection.
As noted above, Westchester Day School is an example of how a court
takes this consideration into account. In that case, the court examined the
primary purpose of the expansion project and asked whether the primary
purpose was religious or not; just because part of the project included
construction of religious-school facilities did not make the entire expan-
- - -123
sion religious exercise.
The Westchester court noted that the trial court carefully considered
how each classroom in a school expansion project would be used and
found that they would all be used at least in part for religious purposes.124
The court explained that it was not necessary that all the rooms be used
for religious purposes for the project to receive protection from RLUIPA,
but it declined to "demarcate the exact line at which a school expansion
project comes to implicate RLUIPA."'25 The court suggested that a dis-
126
trict court should determine the overall purpose of the project.
Therefore, the construction of a church which included an adminis-
trative office would likely qualify as religious exercise, but if a church only
wanted to build a basketball court, the project would not be religious ex-
ercise. Furthermore, if a church wanted to construct an expansion that
included athletic facilities, a game room, and other recreational facilities,
in addition to a classroom for religious instruction, the project would
mostly likely not qualify as religious exercise. After engaging in fact find-
ing to determine the primary purpose of the project-whether
comparing the square feet of the various uses in the project or determin-
ing how much time people are likely to spend in the various portions of
the project once it is complete-a court would find that the vast majority
of the project was for recreational uses. The primary purpose of that pro-
ject would therefore be recreational.
D. Consideration Three: RLUIPA Does Not Protect Uses
just Because They Support Worship
Finally, courts do not consider activities that merely support worship
activities and religious education to be religious exercise. This limitation
means that commercial activities that raise money for worship activities
122. Id. at 347-48
123. Id. at 348.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 347-48.
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and religious education, as well as activities that support worship activities
and religious education in other ways, do not qualify either.127 RLUIPA's
legislative history is explicit that activity that commercially supports wor-
ship activities does not qualify as religious exercise.12 Therefore, land use
does not become religious exercise under RLUIPA merely because it ad-
vertises, promotes, recruits, fundraises, does administrative work for,
generates profit for, or in other ways supports religious exercise.129
The Westchester Day School court also reasoned consistently with
Consideration Three. Though the project would benefit a religious
school-and possibly attract more students-by enhancing the quality of
the school's secular education, the Second Circuit rejected this justifica-
tion for broadening the scope of uses RLUIPA protects. 0 Judge Leval
wrote that just because improved secular facilities "would enhance the
overall experience of the students" does not make the entire expansion
religious exercise. 3 1 Other courts have also reasoned consistently with
Consideration Three. For example, a California appellate court held that
RLUIPA does not make commercial activity funding religious organiza-
tions and activities religious exercise.12
127. See Scottish Rite Cathedral Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 207,
216 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) ("Specifically, a burden on a commercial enterprise used to fund a
religious organization does not constitute a substantial burden on 'religious exercise' with-
in the meaning of RLUIPA."); see also New Life Worship Ctr. v. Town of Smithfield
Zoning Bd. of Review, C.A. No. 09-0924, 2010 R.I. Super. LEXIS 101, at *40 (R.I. Su-
per. Ct. July 7, 2010) ("[T]he fitness facility and dance studio within the high school
building would be used to generate revenue for New Life. This Court is satisfied that this
building is not automatically protected as falling within the definition of religious exer-
cise.").
128. 146 CONG. REC. S7774, S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) Ex. 1 (Joint Statement of
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy) ("In many cases, real property is used by religious institu-
tions for purposes that are comparable to those carried out by other institutions. While
recognizing that these activities or facilities may be owned, sponsored or operated by a
religious institution, or may permit a religious institution to obtain additional funds to
further its religious activities, this alone does not automatically bring these activities or
facilities within the bill's definition or 'religious exercise.' For example, a burden on a
commercial building, which is connected to religious exercise primarily by the fact that
the proceeds from the building's operation would be used to support religious exercise, is
not a substantial burden on 'religious exercise: ")
129. See id.
130. Westchester Day Sch. v.Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2004)
("According to this logic, any improvement or enlargement proposed by a religious school
to its secular educational and accessory facilities would be immune from regulation or
rejection by a zoning board so long as the proposed improvement would enhance the
overall experience of the students."); accord Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck,
504 E3d 338, 347-48 (2d. Cir. 2007).
131. Westchester Day Sch., 386 F3d at 189. The later panel agreed with Judge Leval's
reasoning. 504 E3d at 347.
132. Scottish Rite Cathedral Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 207, 216
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (citing 146 CONG. REc. S7774, S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (Joint
Statement of Senators Hatch and Kennedy)).
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While these considerations and the threshold inquiries that precede
them should be further developed as courts decide more cases concerning
the definition of religious exercise in RLUIPA's substantial burden provi-
sion, they provide a straightforward method of analysis. This method can
assist courts in adhering to the intent of the statute's drafters, as well as the
Constitution. This method also brings coherence to precedent that, while
moving in the direction of limiting the scope of religious exercise, has not
done so in a consistent manner.
E. Justifying an Aggressive Interpretation of Rehgious Exercise
As this Note explains, many courts have aggressively interpreted
RLUIPA to narrow the definition of religious exercise. While this Note
focuses on restating the case law rather than advocating for a particular
method of interpretation, there are three justifications for supporting an
aggressive interpretation. These justifications are the doctrine of constitu-
tional avoidance, language in RLUIPA's text, and RLUIPA's legislative
history.
The doctrine of constitutional avoidance is well established.3 3 Justice
Scalia has described the doctrine as "a tool for choosing between compet-
ing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable
presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises
serious constitutional doubts."' As Justice Scalia explained, "The canon is
thus a means of giving effect to congressional intent, not of subverting
it.
In a piece considering RLUIPA's actual impact, Brain Alden sug-
gests courts have interpreted RLUIPA narrowly to avoid an
unconstitutional outcome.'3 6 Judge Leval noted that a broad definition of
religious exercise would trigger constitutional problems because it would
give preference to a religious entity over a secular one if both wanted to
133. See Legal Servs. Corp. v.Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001); Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958); Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 62 ("When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided.").
134. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005).
135. Id. at 382.
136. Alden, supra note 9, at 1817-18.
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build identical projects.13 7 The Seventh Circuit has also applied the doc-
trine to RLUIPA in a prisoner suit.'
Another justification for the method of interpretation in this Note
can be found in the statute itself. The statute contains a section titled "Es-
tablishment Clause unaffected," which directs judges to interpret
RLUIPA in a way that does not make it unconstitutional. The text reads,
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any
way address that portion of the First Amendment to the Constitution
prohibiting laws respecting an establishment of religion (referred to in this
section as the 'Establishment Clause')."19 It was therefore not only the
intention of the legislators, but also enacted into law, that RLUIPA should
not be interpreted in a way that violates the establishment clause.
The legislative history further justifies an aggressive interpretation.
This Note does not intend to enter the debate among legal scholars as to
when or even whether courts should rely on legislative history,o4 0 but as
noted above, RLUIPA's legislative history indicates Congress did not in-
tend to grant religious entities total land-use immunity; rather, Congress
141intended that there be limits on the definition of religious exercise.
IV. SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN SECTION
A. Courts Have Interpreted "Substantial Burden" Narrowly
As noted above, the way the courts interpret various terms in
RLUIPA aside from religious exercise-including such terms as "land-use
regulation," "compelling governmental interest," "substantial burden," and
"individualized assessment"-affects the breadth of protection RLUIPA
provides to religious uses. The courts' definition of "substantial burden"
has had a particularly significant impact. Because of this impact, even
though RLUIPA's definition of religious exercise expanded the breadth
of uses that receive protection, the substantial burden provision does not
137. Westchester Day Sch. v.Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004);
see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37 (1997) (Stevensj., concurring).
138. Nelson v. Miller, 570 E3d 868, 889 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Sossamon v. State of
Tex., 560 F3d 316, 329 (5th Cir. 2009); Greater Bible Way Temple of Jackson v. City of
Jackson, 733 NW2d 734,754 n.27 (Mich. 2007).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-4 (2006).
140. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) ("The greatest defect of
legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of leg-
islators.") (Scalia, J., concurring); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992).
141. 146 CONG. REC. S7774, S7776 (daily ed.July 27, 2000) Ex. 1 (Joint Statement of
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
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result in the scope of protection some have feared.12 Courts use varying
definitions of substantial burden, but the standard is always significant.
Courts have interpreted the term consistently with the Smith framework:
complying with general land-use laws usually does not amount to a sub-
stantial burden."' This requirement prevents the statute from providing
land-use immunity to nonworship uses.
RLUIPA itself does not define substantial burden.' 4 The legislative
history explains that the Act does not change the courts' definition of
substantial burden and that even RLUIPA cc-3(g) (which says RLUIPA
should be interpreted to provide "broad protection of religious exercise,
to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the
Constitution") does not affect the definition of substantial burden.'4 Not
surprisingly, courts agree that the definition is up to the judiciary.'46
Generally, Salkin and Lavine, two of many scholars who have thor-
oughly studied and written on the definition of "substantial burden,"
found that courts do not tend to view the following as substantial bur-
dens: permit application requirements, preclusion from operating at a
specific location when there are "reasonable alternatives" available, mere
inconvenience, cost, delay, or denial of a request to expand when "reasona-
ble alternatives" are available. 47 Courts are more likely to find a substantial
burden if there is some evidence of discriminatory treatment.
Though the Seventh Circuit has offered various definitions of
"substantial burden," 49 the court recently said that a burden is substantial if
it "'necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for
142. As a reminder, 42 US. C. ( 2000 cc(a) reads: "No government shall impose or
implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the gov-
ernment demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or
institution" is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental inter-
est. See Welch, supra note 7, at 276-77 ("RLUIPA's broadening of the definition of
religious exercise all but guarantees that most religious institutions will proceed to the
issue of whether a land use regulation imposes a substantial burden on its conduct.").
143. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 10, at 227-34.
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5.
145. 146 CONG. REC. S7774, S7774 (2000) (daily ed. July 27, 2000). Salkin and
Lavine hint at an interesting quandary: If RLUIPA codifies Supreme Court jurisprudence
on substantial burden, should that codification include Smith's rule that a neutral, generally
applicable policy does not violate the free exercise clause-the very rule RLUIPA sought
to overturn? Salkin & Lavine, supra note 10, at 233.
146. See, e.g.,Vision Church v.Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F3d 975, 997 (7th Cir. 2006)
(citing Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2006); Mid-
rash Sephardi, Inc. v.Town of Surfside, 366 F3d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004)).
147. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 10, at 228-33.
148. Id. at 233.
149. See e.g., Sts. Constantine and Helene Catholic Church v. City of New Berlin,
396 F3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding a burden does not need to be "insuperable" for
it to be substantial).
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rendering religious exercise-including the use of real property for the
purpose thereof within the regulated jurisdiction generally-effectively
impracticable."'-" It continued, "[T]he Supreme Court has found a
'substantial burden' to exist when the government put 'substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.' "5
The Second Circuit considers a number of factors before finding a
substantial burden: whether the action is arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful;
"whether there are quick, reliable, and financially feasible alternatives;"
and "whether the denial was conditional.",152 In Westchester Day School, the
court found the government imposed a substantial burden when it denied
an application to expand the school, in large part because it found the
denial to be "arbitrary and unlawful." 5 3
The common ground among courts is that a regulation that indi-
rectly makes the practice of religion more difficult does not create a
substantial burden.' After surveying the circuits, the Michigan Supreme
Court articulated its test for a substantial burden: "[A] 'substantial burden'
exists when one is forced to choose between violating a law (or forfeiting
an important benefit) and violating one's religious tenets.,"5 The court
went on to say that an "inconvenience," "irritation," and "something that
simply makes it more difficult ... to practice one's religion," do not quali-
fy as a substantial burden.5 6 The court held that even if it assumed that
building an apartment complex was a religious exercise, a government's
decision to refuse to rezone property so the religious organization could
build the apartments would not create a substantial burden.5 7 The court
explained that the government was not prohibiting the religious organiza-
tion from building an apartment complex, but regulating where such an
150. Vision Church, 468 E3d at 997 (quoting Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v.
City of Chicago, 342 F3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003).
151. Id. at 997 (quoting Hobbie v. Unemp't Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141
(1987)); see also World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago, 591 E3d 531, 537
(7th Cir. 2009) (holding conduct amounting to malicious prosecution imposed a substan-
tial burden).
152. Westchester Day Sch. v.Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F3d 338, 352 (2d. Cir. 2007).
153. Id. at 352-53.
154. See also Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F3d 643,662
(10th Cir. 2006) ("The Supreme Court stated ... that the incidental effects of otherwise
lawful government programs 'which may make it more difficult to practice certain reli-
gions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their
religious beliefs' do not constitute substantial burdens on the exercise of religion.") (quot-
ing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988)).
Consistent with Smith, the courts generally hold that neutral, generally applicable policies
that require religious organizations to follow the law do not impose a substantial burden.






apartment complex could be built.18 Thus, under this test, requiring a
religious organization "to follow the law like everyone else" does not im-
pose a substantial burden."9 This interpretation means that RLUIPA does
not provide religious exercises with land-use immunity, rather protection
from substantial burdens.
B. The Definition of Substantial Burden Further Limits RLUIPA's Protection
Because a religious land use only receives strict-scrutiny protection
if a land-use regulation imposes a substantial burden on the land use,
RLUIPA's relatively broad definition of religious exercise does not have
the extreme impact many observers predicted. For example, the Episcopal
Student Foundation court, which decided that concerts to raise money for
and expand a church's membership were religious exercise, declined to
find that denial of a permit to allow the religious organization to demol-
ish its current facility and build a new one constituted a substantial
burden.'" The court found that "the Defendants' permit denial in no way
precludes Canterbury House from exploring other options short of
demolition. Nor is there any evidence that animus played a role in the
Defendants' conduct." 6'
Men of Destiny Ministriesl62 also illustrates that even if an activity
qualifies as religious exercise, the definition of substantial burden restricts
RLUIPA's protection of religious entities' land use. In Men of Destiny Min-
istries, the court found that a ministry geared toward rehabilitating men
with substance-abuse problems qualified as religious exercise. Such a
finding could frighten neighbors who might not want rehabilitation facil-
ities to be immune from land-use regulation. But the court went on to
hold that complying with local land-use law did not impose a substantial
burden on the ministry: "4DM remains free to relocate its program to
another location in the County where it can operate as of right, or to
operate its ministry by other methods-such as a non-residential facili-
ty. ... "64 In other words, it would not be a substantial burden for the
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Episcopal Student Found. v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F Supp. 2d 691, 704 (E.D.
Mich. 2004). But see Mintz v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield, 424 F Supp. 2d 309,
322 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding denial of a permit to build a parish center constituted a sub-
stantial burden).
161. Episcopal Student Found., 341 F Supp. 2d at 708.
162. Men of Destiny Ministries, Inc. v. Osceola County, No. 6:06-cv-624-Orl-
31DAB, 2006 WL 3219321 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6,2006).
163. Id. at *4 (finding the ministry "clearly motivated by ... religious beliefs" and
"constitute[ing] a religious exercise for purposes of the RLUIPA. As such, use of the ...
property for that purpose would also constitute a religious exercise.").
164. Id. at *5.
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facility to relocate. 16 Therefore, RLUIPA's definition of religious exercise
does not result in the outcomes critics feared because even worship uses
do not receive land-use immunity.'6
Another case, Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills,67
provides an example of how the substantial burden provision limits
RLUIPA's impact for a use that may or may not qualify as religious exer-
cise. In that case, a church asked for a special use permit to convert
adjacent property into a 300-space parking lot.1" The church wanted to
expand its parking facilities to accommodate future growth in member-
ship, though its current parking availability was sufficient for its needs at
the time. The city denied the request."o As the court in Castle Hills
pointed out, while a church is not entitled to as much parking as it
wants, 7 ' "[p]hysical access to a community of worship is crucial to a reli-
gious observer's ability to practice both faith and religious conduct within
a community. A governmental regulation that precludes such access to the
worshiping community presents a substantial burden to the religious exer-
cise." 7 2 Though the court said that access is essential to religious exercise,
it found that the denial did not impose a substantial burden on religious
exercise.'7 3 A church, the court explained, is not entitled to unlimited
parking facilities. 174
Consideration Three seems to counsel against classifying a parking
lot expansion to support significant growth of a congregation (or a com-
mercial parking lot) as religious exercise. But a city's refusal to allow
construction of a church with adequate parking could prevent access to
the church and therefore impose a substantial burden on the congrega-
165. See id. at *5 ("[So long as other locations ... are reasonably available, Osceola
County has not imposed a substantial burden . . . on religious exercise.").
166. Saxer, supra note 69, at 628 ("Although the phrase 'religious exercise' has been
intentionally and explicitly given a broader meaning under RLUIPA, continuing to nar-
rowly define what constitutes a 'substantial burden' will negate Congress's attempt to
broaden religious land use protection.")
167. Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, No. SA-01-CA-1149-
RF, 2004 WL 546792 (WD.Tex. Mar. 17, 2004).
168. Id. at *5.
169. Id.
170. Id. at *6.
171. Id. at *12.
172. Id. at *11.
173. Id. ("By denying the parking SUP, the burden worked upon the Church is one
of financial cost and inconvenience, as well as the frustration of not getting what one
wants. None of these burdens, however, is substantial and none rises to the level necessary
to trigger strict scrutiny under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.").
174. Id. at *12 ("[T]his is a situation in which a successful church hopes to be more
so, but the questions remain, just how much parking does a church need and how much
parking must the City permit it. Surely, the answer is not whatever amount the church
desires. The answer must be a reasonable amount, to be determined by the City or other
governing body, in the absence of unacceptable religious discrimination.").
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tion's religious exercise. The point is that both requirements must be met.
A court needs to find both that a particular use is religious exercise and
that a government's denial of the project imposed a substantial burden on
that exercise for RLUIPA to provide strict-scrutiny protection.
CONCLUSION
In the years following RLUIPA's passage, many legal observers
called for revisions to the statute. One commentator called for a new
provision to limit statutory protection for nonworship uses. Another
called for new language as part of a significantly longer substantial burden
provision that could only be triggered by intentional discrimination. 7 7
These proposals to amend the statute are academic. Congress passed the
statute unanimously, members of both political parties sponsored the leg-
islation, and President Clinton signed it.17 8 Furthermore, as one of those
observers noted, "Courts have not .. . dealt with auxiliary uses with the
same permissiveness as they have dealt with facilities used primarily for
worship.",7 9
After examining a decade of case law, this Note observes that courts
have interpreted the statute's substantial burden protection narrowly and
have not used the provision to protect an array of nonworship land uses.8 o
The outcomes actual courts have reached should ease the fears of those
concerned that "Section 2(a) has created havoc in local land use govern-
ance related to religious entities, altered politics at the local level, and cost
taxpayers millions." 8' Even though the substantial burden provision only
protects a relatively narrow range of activities in which religious organiza-
tions engage, it is important to remember that the statute contains other
provisions that protect religious organizations from discriminatory treat-
ment in land-use decisions related to a broader range of uses.'18 2
175. See, e.g., Sara Witt, Comment, Modifying the Religious Land Use and Institutional-
ized Persons Act to Create a Constitutional Statutory Protection for Religious Landowners, 59 CASE
W REs. L. REv. 767 (2009).
176. Galvan, supra note 10, at 236-37.
177. Lennington, supra note 9, at 837-38.
178. Bill Summary & Status 106th Congress (1999-2000), S.2869, http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:SNO2869:@@@L&sunm2=m& (last visited
Mar. 11, 2012).
179. Galvan, supra note 10, at 228.
180. For a smart commentary on RLUIPA, arguing its impact has been far more
limited than critics suggest, see Alden, supra note 9. But see Note, Religious Land Use in the
Federal Courts Under RLUIPA, 120 HARv. L. REv. 2178 2179 (2007) (arguing RLUIPA has
aided plaintiffs, though not discussing nonworship uses).
181. Hamilton, supra note 13, at 412; see Alden, supra note 14, at 1805 (explaining
many plaintiffs who have had success suing under RLUIPA would have had success with
First Amendment challenges in RLUIPA's absence).
182. MacLeod, supra note 118, at 172-73.
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Though courts have interpreted religious exercise narrowly, this
Note has sought to provide coherence to the case law by extracting major
trends in the ways courts have interpreted the phrase. The three consid-
erations explained in this Note are not bright-line rules, but they should
assist courts trying to determine if a given use should receive protection
from RLUIPA's substantial burden provision.
